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1 Introduction
Vietnam relates to China in a way typical of former
colonies which have had to struggle for indepen-
dence: it distrusts and rejects China at the same
time as being highly influenced by developments
there. China is in fact the most obvious image of
what the future could hold for the health sector in
Vietnam. Their development prior to recent
reforms was run along similar lines; the reform
process shares many features; and many of the
problems currently being experienced in China are
also found in Vietnam. Vietnam would therefore be
wise to study the current situation in rural areas of
China and take from them both positive and nega-
tive lessons about how to manage ongoing changes
in its own health sector.
2 The Health Situation in Vietnam
Prior to Reform
After independence (in 1954 in the north, 1975 in
the south), the emphasis in Vietnam was on devel-
oping an infrastructure to provide basic health care
and training up health workers to meet norms of
numbers of doctors per population. This was car-
ried out at the same time as land reform and other
policies which ensured a relatively equitable distri-
bution of resources in society Access to health ser-
vices at commune health centres was provided for
around 90 per cent of the population and preven-
tive activities were given prominence through the
mobilisation campaigns of the Communist Party
and related social organisations. Consequently,
Vietnam's health indicators were better than
expected given its low GNP per capita (UNICEF
1994).
We have to be wary in Vietnam as well as in China,
of 'golden ageing the past'. The primary health care
system at that time was underfunded, in terms of
equipment and supplies in particular; many of its
staff were undertrained or poorly trained; the ser-
vices were probably of poor quality and unrespon-
sive to patient needs, although patient expectations
were also lower. The lack of independent data from
the period prior to the mid-1980s means that the
myth of a perfectly functioning FliC system is hard
to disprove, but a myth it nevertheless almost cer-
tainly is (Vogel, 1987).
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3 Do! Moi: the Economic Reform
Process
By the mid to late 1980s, the Vietnamese economy
was in crisis, with output falling, inflation growing,
continued international isolation, and aid from its
former ally, the Soviet Union, about to cease. In
1986 the policy of doi moi was announced, which
heralded widespread economic liberalisation under
the aegis of the Communist Party, which has
retained a monopoly of political power, albeit with
some concessions on the separation of government
from party
In a period of a few years around 1990, an eco-
nomic revolution took place along lines now famil-
iar in a number of transitional economies.
Agricultural production was handed back to the
household level; prices of most commodities freed;
subsidies almost totally removed; exchange rates
moved from fixed to floating; state-owned enter-
prises lost most of their privileges; the banking sys-
tem was reformed; inflation was brought down to
single figure levels; and foreign trade and invest-
ment, as well as aid, was encouraged (IMF 1994).
The results were largely positive. Rice production
grew and prices rose, so that the 70 per cent of the
population engaged in agriculture experienced
some immediate gains from the reforms. Business
opportunities in towns and cities also expanded,
and overall GNP growth has been in the region of
eight per cent per annum in the last few years.
However, growth is commonly the cause of
increased inequalities, and this has been the case in
Vietnam, where families with poor land, or lacking
labour and capital, and living in remote and impov-
erished areas have seen their situation deteriorate in
relative terms (Long 1993). Social safety nets such
as free education, health and collective social funds
have largely disappeared and households have had
to meet their needs on their own. At the same time,
the loss of its automatic revenue from production
has left the central government with less ability to
determine policy at the local level, and the com-
munes with less money to provide services. The
government is now trying to partly reverse this
involuntary decentralisation through reform of the
fiscal system.
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4 Reform in the Health Sector
The three main changes in health policy which
resulted from doi moi were the legitimisation of pri-
vate practice; the liberalisation of pharmaceutical
production and sales; and the introduction of fees
for curative services in the public sector (albeit at
low level, below costs). A difference from China is
that there has been no structural reform of the
health system, which remains integrated and largely
financed by public money
One important consequence of changes in health
policy has been a drop of about 50 per cent in the
use of public facilities since 1989. This presumably
reflects the increased prices of the public sector, its
poor quality, and the existence of alternatives. The
most striking trend has been towards self-prescrip-
tion, which is now the course taken by two-thirds
of people experiencing illness, according to World
Bank figures (World Bank 1995). The private sector
has also been growing, especially in cities, but
almost entirely in the form of public servants carry-
ing out private services in or after hours. The con-
fusion of public and private sectors, found in
China, is therefore also a feature of the health mar-
ket in Vietnam today
Although state funding for health has been main-
tained, in real terms, private expenditure on health
has increased greatly and now constitutes around 85
per cent of the expenditure on health (World Bank
1995). Most of this money is spent on drugs though,
rather than contributing to cost recovery in the pub-
lic sector through fees. The lowest level of health
worker prior to reform, the brigade nurses, who were
funded by the cooperatives, have now all but disap-
peared and the commune health staff, previously
paid for by the communes, are now being taken onto
the state pay-roll as many communes are no longer
able to support them (Guidner and Rifkin 1993).
5 Challenges in the Health Sector
There are many challenges facing the health sector
in Vietnam at present. The majority are shared with
China, although there are some notable differences.
Underfunding: Although state funding has held
up, as mentioned, the system was underfunded
before in most areas - salaries, supplies, capital
costs and maintenance - and that problem has been
exacerbated by the price rises and increase in
expectations under doi moi. Cost recovery is limited
because fees are low and the ability of the rural pop-
ulation to pay for health is restricted. A programme
is underway to develop health insurance in rural
areas, but it will face problems because of low
income levels, the need for effective exemption
mechanisms, and the lack of trusted local collective
bodies to administer the scheme (Ensor 1995).
Successful experiments with rural health insurance
in China would be of particular interest to policy
makers in Vietnam.
Access: Services which used to be free are now fee-
paying, and although the fees are low, the burden ill-
ness imposes on families is now much greater than
before, especially when taking into account informal
payments to staff and the cost of drugs. Access has
therefore become an issue, which will only get worse
as costs in the health sector rise (Tipping et al.
1994). The growth in self-prescription can be seen
as an attempt to minimise costs by families, with
possible negative consequences for their health as a
result of inappropriate treatment. Expenditure in the
public sector is also biased towards the higher level
referral services, with only five per cent of the health
budget being spent at commune level where most of
the poor live (World Bank 1995).
Overextended infrastructure: The combination of
large infrastructure of buildings and staff, low utili-
sation and low overall funding is a relatively com-
mon scenario in transitional economies. It results in
a service which exists but does not have the funds
to operate and consequently loses the confidence of
the public. Moreover, if, as in China, staff and other
costs rise with general economic growth, the prob-
lem will be exacerbated, with staff costs absorbing
the whole of the public health budget (salaries are
remarkably low at present, but this too has adverse
consequences). In recognition of this, the Ministry
of Health in Hanoi has called for staff reductions at
all levels of the health service. However, the bureau-
cratic culture and lack of alternative employment
has meant that these reductions have not been
forthcoming so far. A shift from training to retrain-
ing is also required, as is a change in staff mix from
doctors to nurses and administrators (Abbatt 1989).
Drugs overuse: As in China, growth in consump-
tion of drugs in a largely unregulated market is cre-
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ating a threat to cost-effective health care. The chal-
lenge is four-fold: to educate the public on the
potential danger of overuse of drugs; to re-train staff
in appropriate prescribing practices; to ensure that
staff do not have financial incentives to over-pre-
scribe (e.g. getting income from commune revolv-
ing drug funds); and to have effective regulation of
the private pharmacies, which have sprung up since
1990. All four strategies have to be pursued if the
policy is to be successful.
Preventive activities: Unlike in China, these ser-
vices are still provided free, at least in theory, and
coverage rates remain relatively high. However,
these national programmes are currently quite heav-
ily supported by foreign donors, and in the longer
term funding needs to be secured for them from
local resources, if the achievement is to be sustained.
Management issues: Management systems in the
health sector have not adapted sufficiently to the
new conditions. Funding at the province and dis-
trict level is still calculated according to norms, and
although the basis for those norms has changed
from beds to population, there is still too little flex-
ibility for local managers to shift expenditure from
one category to another, without the agreement of
the national level. At the same time as being over-
centralised in this respect, local levels are more
independent financially, which means that it can be
hard to implement central policies, to gather infor-
mation about activities, etc. It is perhaps not
uncommon to find this paradox in transitional
economies: that they are both too anarchic and too
controlled at once.
6 Lessons from Recent Reforms
in China
It is clear from the above brief description that there
are many similarities between the situation in China
and that in Vietnam. There are also some salient dif-
ferences, such as the formal autonomy which has
been granted to service providers in China, the
degree to which they support themselves by charg-
ing fees to patients, the fact that preventive services
are charged for, and the problem of cost escalation
and its connection with salary levels and the incen-
tives to invest in high technology equipment in
China. These differences may, however, merely
reflect the lag in growth between China and
Vietnam: if the Vietnamese economy continues to
grow at its current level, it is likely to face exactly
the same issues unless it takes deliberate policy
decisions to pursue an alternative strategy. China
now can serve as a mirror into Vietnam's future.
What are the lessons which it might reflect?
China's experiments with health financing are of key
interest, particularly the difficulty of maintaining
coverage in rural areas and controlling costs. China's
experience supports the view that the combination of
voluntary health insurance and fee-for-service pay-
ments tends to lead to cost escalation and an increase
in higher level curative activities (Bogg et al. 1996).
Decentralisation in China has taken the form of
giving health providers in the public sector greater
autonomy in raising funds and managing them-
selves. This can be likened to hospital trusts in the
UK, which have remained in the public sector but
been given budgetary autonomy. The theory behind
this change is that competition between providers
will provide benefits in the form of more efficiency
(i.e. lower costs) and, in the case of China where
fees were introduced, increased mobilisation of pri-
vate resources.
In practice, though, China has experienced cost
escalation rather than cost cutting. This is in part
due to government policy on staff salaries, which
have risen in line with growth in the fastest devel-
oping parts of China, and also its controls on prices
for basic health care, which have encouraged health
facilities to invest in higher technology which is
more profitable. Using staffing levels to allocate
government funds is also not the best way to
encourage increased efficiency amongst providers.
However, even if norms are changed and the labour
market made more flexible and price controls
(which aimed at ensuring access) replaced with
exemption mechanisms and/or social funds, it is
still possible that introducing competition between
provider units would result in non-price competi-
tion, which increases rather than decreases costs.
This has been observed in countries like the US,
especially when health insurance is the dominant
method of financing. The competition between
providers not only increases costs but may reinforce
trends towards less effective health care (such as
over-prescribing or overuse of diagnostic tests,
which may be popular, rather than basic preventive
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activities, which would reduce demand for the
providers' services).
In terms of resource mobilisation, China's health
providers appear to have been successful in raising
an average of 75 per cent of their budget from pri-
vate sources (see article by Chen Jie in this
Bulletin). However, as stated, these resources may
not be used in the most effective way to maximise
health gains. The level of fees is also creating a
major barrier to access, with substantial evidence
that peasants cannot afford to seek treatment and
that treatment is a serious source of indebtedness
and financial hardship (see articles by Yu et al. and
Lie et al. in this Bulletin.
China's experience also identifies some further
potential problems of decentralisation, notably the
lack of incentives to pass information from one level
to the next, to supervise the lower level services and
provide support to them, and generally to coordi-
nate services to meet the needs of the population.
This is particularly true when there is no strong
purchasing agency, with the financial muscle to
identify health needs and plan and purchase appro-
priate services. In this situation, the system frag-
ments into all level of providers competing to
provide the profitable services, which may well not
be the more cost-effective ones.
The question which this raises is whether some of
the benefits which were sought through decentrali-
sation might not be better realised within an inte-
grated system in countries like Vietnam. Increased
efficiency, for example, could be achieved by chang-
ing the system for paying providers, introducing
target payments and payments based on staff pro-
ductivity Given the inequalities between regions in
terms of wealth, there is also a strong argument for
national funding mechanisms, such as an ear-
marked tax, rather than fees for service or local vol-
untary health insurance schemes, which do not
allow cross subsidisation between provinces and a
larger pooling of risks and which are likely to leave
a substantial part of the population uncovered. The
difference in health budgets between rich provinces
like Ho Chi Minh City and the northern central
region is already remarkable: up to three times as
much is spent per capita (Smithson 1993). These
differences are likely to increase rather than
decrease in the future, as China illustrates.
The story of health in China in recent years also
points to the importance of political commitment.
lt appears that at one stage, health came high on the
political agenda, but it has now been 'privatised
away' as an issue of lesser concern. In Vietnam, the
Communist Party seems to be committed to main-
taining the social gains of its previous era. It may be
that this forms a part of its nationalist appeal and
hence general political legitimacy If so, it is likely
that more priority will be paid to solving some of
the problems listed above. As in China, though,
there is a widespread disenchantment with collec-
tive activities amongst working people, as a result of
the recent history and maintaining the credibility of
the public sector will require a range of reforms.
7 Conclusion
The experiment which has been going on in health
in China is of interest to many developing coun-
tries, but especially countries in transition from a
communist system. Of these, Vietnam is arguably
the one which most closely resembles China in
terms of its past, its culture, and the present prob-
lems in the health sector (at least if the comparison
is made with poor rural areas in China). I have
therefore argued that China presents a most useful
mirror of the future for Vietnam, which only
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